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UNVEILING OF THE STATUE 



Major-General George G. Meade, 



In Philadelphia, October i8th, 1887. 



By general JOHN GIBBON, 
U. S. Army. 



PHILADELPHIA : 
ALLEN, LANE & SCOTT'S PRINTING HOUSE, 

Nos. 229, 231, and 233 South Fifth Street. 
1887. 



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UNVEILING OF THE STATUE 



Major-General George G. Meade, 



In Philadelphia, October i8th, 1887. 



By general JOHN GIBBON, 
U. S. Army. 



PHILADELPHIA : 

ALLEN, LANE & SCOTT'S PRINTING HOUSE, 

Nos. 229, 231, and 233 South Fifth Street. 

1887. 



61&03 
J5 • 



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE. 



Nearly forty years ago the Seminole Indians broke out and 
commenced murdering the settlers in Florida. Troops were 
sent into the country and a line of camps was established 
across the Peninsula. Into one of these camps, late one 
afternoon, rode a horseman attended by a single orderly. 
He was a gaunt, thin man, with a hatchet face and a promi- 
nent aquiline nose. He introduced himself as Lieutenant 
Meade, Topographical Engineers, just from a reconnoissance 
on the hostile border. He was wet, tired, and hungry. It 
was my good fortune to be able to offer dry clothes, food, and 
a bed of blankets to one whose name was destined fourteen 
years later to render famous the little town of Gettysburg, in 
the southern part of Pennsylvania. 

It was the first time I had met him. He was then about 
thirty-four years of age, had accompanied our army into 
Mexico, served in the war with that coantry in a subordinate 
position and without any especial n*)tipej. The next time we 
met he was a Brigadier-General of volunteers, commanding a 
brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves in front of Washington 
in the fall of i86i. 

Up to that time Meade had never commanded even a com- 
pany of soldiers. Hence he entered upon his military duties 
totally unused personally to active command, and dependent 
for success upon the basis of his military education and his 
good judgment and tact in governing men. Although, there- 
fore, an officer of the regular army. General Meade was es.sen- 
tially a volunteer, commanding volunteers. These, fresh from 
the ranks of the people, and green in all military matters, 



were totally ignorant of the art of war, its stern requirements, 
or the exactions and sacrifices incident to the preparation for 
it. Meade was especially fortunate in his associates ; for George 
A. McCall, one of the most distinguished officers of his time, 
was his division commander, and the other brigade command- 
ers were destined to inscribe their names high on the glory 
roll of their country — John F. Reynolds and E. O. C. Ord. 

There were regular officers who at the commencement of 
our civil war, unmindful of the different circumstances under 
which they were serving, seemed to think there was but one 
way to enforce discipline in our volunteer forces, and that was 
by following the old rut and routine of the regular army. 
Such an idea never found place in the minds of the officers I 
have mentioned ; and the results, as exemplified in the subse- 
quent career of the Pennsylvania Reserves, amply justified 
the wisdom and sound judgment of those they were fortunate 
enough to have placed in command o\'er them. 

It was frequently noted, during the war and afterwards, 
how much of the renown gained by volunteer organizations 
could be traced back to the right direction given to their 
efforts by the sound judgment, good, hard common sense, 
firm hand, and just dealings of the commanders who first took 
them in charge. 

For these qualities Meade became early distinguished; and 
his efforts in disciplining, drilling his command, and gaining 
the confidence of his men were fully exemplified in the first 
battles they went into and in their whole subsequent career. 

On the 30tli of June, 1862, General Meade was severely 
wounded at the head of his brigade in the battle of Glendale, 
and retired from the field. This wound ultimately caused his 
early death in 1872. Six weeks after it was received here- 
joined his command, took part in the disastrous campaign 
terminating in the defeat of our army at the second battle of 
Bull Run in the last days of August. 

The problem in that campaign, although a simple one, was 



5 

difficult in practical solution principally from the fact that there 
were too many people giving commands to the army. 

The problem was how and in what time to get the Army 
of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia together in front of 
Washington, before Lee could bring superior forces to bear 
upon the latter army. Moving the one army back whilst the 
other was moving forward would shorten at both ends the dis- 
tance between them, and insure a junction in about one-half the 
time it would take if the army in front stood still whilst the 
other moved up to join it from the rear. I touch upon this mat- 
ter merely that I may refer to a conversation held with Meade 
at the time our army was concentrated about Warrenton. He 
had recently returned to his command, and informed me that 
he had just held a conversation with the army commander, 
General Pope, during which Meade asked him the question, 
" What are you doing out here ? You should be falling back 
towards Washington." It is a well-known fact that the au- 
thorities in Washington sent Pope orders to hold his ground 
in advanced positions at the front. Mark the fact that, whilst 
an obscure brigade commander, the future commander of the 
Army of the Potomac had well-defined, sound ideas upon that 
all-important and much underrated subject in military opera- 
tions — strategy. 

Too many commanders resulted in Lee striking one of our 
armies before the other reached its support except in part, 
and after a disastrous defeat we were forced back into the de- 
fenses of Washington. 

By the detachment of John F. Reynolds to organize the 
Pennsylvania militia for the defense of Harrisburg, General 
Meade became the commander of the Division of the Penn- 
sylvania Reserves, then serving in the ist Corps, commanded 
by General Hooker. That division he commanded in the 
battles of South Mountain and Antietam. \\\ the latter 
battle the corps was repulsed in its attack on the enemy's 
position ; and, immediately after, Hooker was wounded and 



left the field. Whilst lying on the ground Hooker expressed 
a wish that Meade (who was not next to himself in rank in 
the corps) were in command of the ist Corps. This wish was 
uttered in the hearing of General John Buford, who, mount- 
ing his horse, rode in hot haste to General McClellan's head- 
quarters and reported Hooker's wish. An order was at once 
issued placing Meade in command of the corps irrespective 
of rank. Thus early in the war was he specially selected on 
the field of battle lor the high and responsible position of 
commanding an army corps. He retained this command 
until the return of Reynolds, when Meade reverted to his 
division, which he retained until he was permanently assigned 
to the command of the 5th Army Corps, soon after the disas- 
trous defeat of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg 
in December, 1862. In this last battle he bore with his divis- 
ion a prominent part under Reynolds on our left, where by 
a gallant charge he broke through the enemy's first line, but 
was forced to give ground by superior numbers. 

Meade's rise had been gradual and sure, and we now find 
him in the position of a corps commander, where it was natu- 
ral to suppose his advice and influence would hav^e a strong 
bearing upon the welfare and future operations of the Army 
of the Potomac. He began now to assume prominence in the 
eyes of men, and his name was already mentioned in connec- 
tion with the future command of that army. But before any 
change was made or even contemplated that devoted army was 
destined to undergo a fiery ordeal in the Chancellorsville cam- 
paign of May, 1863, and a controversy Avhich grew out of that 
battle doubtless caused the eyes of the Washington authori- 
ties to be still further directed towards Meade as one of its 
possible future commanders. 

At the close of that disastrous battle, in which Hooker was 
badly outgeneraled and signally defeated by vastly inferior 
forces, a council of war was held, at which a very decided 
disinclination to retreat was exhibited by prominent generals 



who preferred to remain there and fight, giving employment to 
two whole corps which had scarcely fired a shot in the battle. 
It has almost become a proverb in military affairs that " coun- 
cils of war never fight," but the council at Chancellorsville was 
one of the exceptions to the rule. Contrary to the opinion 
expressed by his prominent generals. Hooker decided to with- 
draw his army to the north bank of the Rappahannock River. 
It was the second instance within nine months where the com- 
mander rather than the army was whipped. 

Then followed Lee's offensive operations and the race north- 
ward of the two great armies, which were finally to come in 
contact at Gettysburg and there decide definitely the fate of 
the campaign. 

To say that after the battle of Chancellorsville the army had 
lost faith in Hooker is simply to state a self-evident proposi- 
tion, for although instances have occurred where armies retain 
their faith in the commanders under whom they have been un- 
fortunate, this was not one of such cases, and the intelligent 
rank and file of our American volunteers could not conceal 
from themselves the fact that we had been badly defeated by 
inferior numbers, and that as a consequence of that defeat 
we, instead of invading the enemy's country, were moving 
back towards Washington for the purpose of defending our 
own territory against his offensive operations. The members 
of that army could not if they would, thrust out of sight the 
all-important questions, " What is going to be the result of 
the next conflict?" and "Are we to have Chancellorsville re- 
peated under the same commander?" With many a mis- 
giving, directly the result of the Chancellorsville campaign, 
we moved northward, left Virginia, entered Maryland and 
were approaching Frederick City, when a staff officer came 
riding along the road on the 28th of June and surprised me 
with the information that Hooker had been relieved from 
command of the army. With considerable trepidation I 
asked "Who succeeds him?" and I uttered a sigh of relief 



8 

and an involuntary " thank God for that " when he reph"ed, 
" General Meade ! " 

The American people were rushed into a terrible war with- 
out the slightest conception of what war really is, and, with 
the exception of the comparatively few who had had a little 
experience thirteen years before in the Mexican war, no one 
had the slightest idea of the stern requirements, the suffering, 
heartburnings, and terrible sacrifices incident to a state of war. 
It will always be the proudest boast in the history of this 
country that a free, independent people should have gone into 
such a war, with such an inadequate idea of what would be 
required of them, and should have so thoroughly and cheer- 
fully surrendered to the stern Moloch of war almost every 
right and privilege that a free people deem sacred. 

To me it was the most wonderful of things to see men go 
into the field, proud in their feelings of independence and in- 
dividuality, confident they knew all about it, and prepared to 
carry everything before them with the same vim and rush 
which had carried them successfully through many a tight 
business place in civil life, gradually awaken to the fact that 
now they were all " at sea" on new and unknown waters, where 
few of the rules which had heretofore governed their lives 
were applicable. It was touching to see how they stumbled 
along, trying to learn, with the blind leading the blind, and how 
eagerly they clung to any one showing a capacity and a willing- 
ness to guide them into the right paths, and when they found 
such a one how completely they surrendered to him every- 
thing which a few weeks before they would have yielded to 
no one but God himself! This feeling, which said so plainly 
" show us the right road," constituted the opportwiity of the 
regular army, and almost every one possessed of the simplest 
A B C of the military art was eventually pushed eagerly to 
the front. Curtin, your great war Governor, will readily tell 
you how, in the latter years of the war, appeal after appeal 
was made to him by bodies of free, independent American 



citizens for some one to reign over them, show them what to 
do, how to do it, and how to lead them in battle. 

The Military Academy, much as it has been reproached 
because every graduate did not blossom into a full-grown 
Napoleon, can at least claim that although West Point does 
not make Generals, West Point officers have made thousands 
of good soldiers, and have demonstrated the fact that the 
American volunteer, when he has a chance to be instructed in 
the military profession, is the first soldier in the zvorld ! It 
may be truthfully asserted that although we were frequently 
oxxt-generaled during the war, we were seldom ont-soldiered. 

Towards the close of the war what a transformation of 
opinion took place ! Then all in the army and many out of 
it recognized as an established fact that an army to be suc- 
cessful must be a perfectly organized machine, subject to the 
control of one man, subject to his sole control ; and it not un- 
frequently happened that the powers of command were exer- 
cised in a despotic and even arbitrary manner. Every com- 
mander who was not allowed this kind of control failed of 
success, and those who did succeed were conspicuously those 
who were not so hampered. One of the most distinguished 
soldiers produced by our war once said if he thought his cap 
knew what was going on in his head he would take it off and 
cast it from him. And yet the commander of one of our 
prominent armies confided to the committee on the conduct 
of the war with great apparent frankness his plans and pur- 
poses one month before active operations of his army com- 
menced, giving plenty of time for the enemy to fully post 
himself! Fortunately no harm was done in this particular 
case, since the campaign, when it took place, differed so com- 
pletely from the one laid down in the committee room that its 
own author could not have recognized it. 

McClellan, who forged the bolt afterwards to be hurled so 
many times against the rebel hosts, was required beforehand 
to submit his plan of campaign to the War Department, at a 



10 

time when every street and almost every house in Washington 
was swarming with active, energetic spies ! and was himself 
placed in charge of one of these armies, the operations of which 
Grant two years later compared to those of a " balky team." 

In those two years, however, we had learned something of 
war. In Grant's hands were placed the reins of the whole 
team, and the great President, whose firm hand guided the 
ship of state, in bidding him good-bye as he started on his 
campaign, bade him God speed, and added, " I do not even 
ask you your plan of campaign !" 

No man recognized this cardinal principle of control in the 
field sooner or more thoroughly than did General Meade. 
In his commands, up to this time, his ivill^ controlled by good, 
sound judgment and a just administration of the law, the reg- 
ulations, and the customs of the service, was the laiv. Knowing 
him so well, I do not, for a moment, question that had he 
been consulted and allowed any option, he would have fol- 
lowed exactly the course pursued by that other great soldier 
of the Army of the Potomac, John Y . Reynolds. 

On very good authority it is stated that when a successor 
to Burnside was under consideration at Washington, the name 
of John F. Reynolds came up, as it was bound to do in any 
consideration of the subject, and that somebody (probably 
General Hallcck) communicated with him and sounded him 
upon the subject. Up to that time the Army of the Potomac 
never had had a commander who had not been hampered by in- 
structions and orders from Washington, which, if they had no 
other evil effect, certainly tended to destroy that independence 
of judgment and undivided control of the army before referred 
to as so essential to successful operations. The published 
correspondence in the records of the rebellion teems with re- 
peated instances of this kind. 

Of course there is no intention of denying to a govern- 
ment the self-evident duty of dictating to its armies the 
military and political necessities of their operations. But 



II 

having laid these down, all further interference in the practical 
operations in the field should cease, and the commander on the 
spot be allowed to carry on his operations in his own way. 
If he fails, the only remedy is to relieve him from command, 
and the risk of failure is a less evil than any likely to result 
from placing the responsibility upon his shoulders and denying 
to him the corresponding control. 

Reynolds' reply was just what might have been expected 
from such a soldier, and is said to have been to the effect that 
whilst he stood prepared to obey all lawful orders sent him, 
yet, if any option were allowed he could not voluntarily ac- 
cept the command unless a liberty of action were guaranteed 
to him considerably beyond what he had any reason to ex- 
pect. There is no mistaking the meaning of this language 
from a soldier like Reynolds, and as a possible commander 
his name sank out of sight. The Government was not yet 
prepared to act on sound military principles, nor bestow high 
command hampered with conditions by the recipient, and 
hence a few months later, when the necessity for relieving 
Hooker became imperative, Meade received no warning from 
the Government and was allowed no option in the matter. He 
was awakened at midnight by a special messenger from Wash- 
ington, and so completely surprised that he could imagine no 
cause for the visit except that he was to be placed in arrest! 

The conclusion to which he jumped amply demonstrates 
how completely unexpected to him was the order placing him 
in command of the army. The foundation for his conclusion, 
when awakened to find himself confronted by Colonel Hardie, 
dates back to the battle of Chancellorsville, barely two months 
before. To properly represent the matter I must revert to 
that battle. As already stated, a council was held at Hooker's 
headquarters after the fighting had ceased, and that in it a 
strong disinclination to retreat was manifested. Reynolds 
and Meade, neither of whose corps had been seriously engaged 
in the battle, the ist Corps not at all, were both outspoken in 



their opinion that the army should not retreat ; and Reynolds, 
whilst the council was going on, lay down, saying, as he did 
so, " My vote will be the same as Meade's," and went sound 
asleep ! Such a thing could not very well have happened 
without a thorough understanding between himself and Meade 
in regard to their opinion as to what was the proper course 
to pursue. But Hooker determined to retreat, and, in spite of 
the formidable condition of the swollen Rappahannock, the 
army successfully recrossed the river. 

The statement which I now make I had from the lips of 
General Meade himself, soon afterwards. It is confirmed in 
every particular by his private letters written at the time. He 
had an interview with General Hooker, and the recent opera- 
tions were discussed between them. To Meade's astonishment 
Hooker informed him that in his determination to retreat he 
had depended more upon Reynolds' and Meade's opinion than 
on any others of his officers. " But," said Meade, in surprise, 
" I did not counsel retreat ! " Hooker insisted that he had, and 
that he had so reported to Washington ! Upon which Meade 
told him in very decided terms that he should join issue with 
him in the matter, as he had persistently insisted that the army 
.should not retreat. Hooker astonished him still more by say- 
ing, " You expressed the opinion at the council that you did 
not believe" it was practicable, under the circumstances, for the 
army to withdraw, but I kneiv that it was practicable" (when 
this conversation took place it had proved practicable), " and 
therefore the main objection you had urged against a retreat 
being groundless, I considered you really in favor of retreat- 
ing ! " Here was a direct and serious rupture between the army 
commander and one of his principal subordinates, and tJie one 
of all others on whom the army commander declared he had 
relied when he gave the order to retreat. Is it any wonder 
that Meade, waked out of a sound sleep at midnight, and 
confronted with a special messenger bearing an order from the 
War Department, should have jumped to the conclusion that 



13 

the order was one placing him in arrest rather than one giving 
him command of the army ? 

All will admit it was a hazardous thing to transfer the com- 
mand of a great army whilst on the match, and almost in con- 
tact with a powerful, enthusiastic enemy, acting then energeti- 
cally on the offensive. But the results of the measure justified 
it in every respect. Meade was equal to the occasion. He 
was at once assured of the enthusiastic support and co-opera- 
tion of his most prominent generals, and the following day he 
issued his orders for the advance of his army. 

The battle of Gettysburg opened three days afterwards. It 
is needless on this occasion to repeat the oft-told story of that 
three days' fierce and sanguinary struggle, in which the brave 
old Army of the Potomac, loyal always to any and every com- 
mander, and to its great mission, hurled back the surging 
waves of Lee's veterans, strewed with its dead and wounded 
the highest tide-mark of the rebellion, and thrust Lee's army 
back from loyal soil. 

It may not, however, be deemed inappropriate on an occa- 
sion like this to refer to some of the incidents preceding and 
attending that battle, for, as in a great many other cases, some 
of the facts have been rendered obscure from the cloudy state- 
ments which have been thrown around them. 

A commander placed in the position where, by an imper- 
ative order of his Government, Meade now found himself, was 
bound at once to enter into some speculation regarding what 
his enemy was doing, what he proposed to do, and what 
course was incumbent upon him to thwart his hostile designs. 
The known elements of the problem before him were very 
few. That Lee was in Pennsylvania, to the north of him, he 
knew, but where he was, or what he was doing, he did not 
know, and could not immediately discover. Unfortunately, 
with a capable opponent acting on the offensive, much of what 
he intends to do, or may possibly do, has to be guessed at. 
Lee might push on to Harrisburg, cross the Susquehanna, 



H 

capture the capital of the State, and march on this city. He 
might retrace his steps, place himself between Meade's army 
and Washington and endanger -the safety of the national cap- 
ital, or he might, if so disposed and mindful of the number of 
sympathizers to be found in the city of Baltimore, almost east 
from Meade's position, move directly on that city. His pos- 
.session of Baltimore would still more seriously imperil Wash- 
ington. Now, whilst defending both Washington and Balti- 
more by interposing his army, Meade, if slow in moving, 
might give Lee time to march northward, effect the crossing 
of the Susquehanna and the capture of Harrisburg. This 
I personally knew was a matter which filled Meade's thoughts 
and gave him very great concern. A glance at the map will. 
show north-east of Frederick, and at a distance about equal to 
that from Baltimore, the small town of Westminster, then the 
terminus of a railroad from Baltimore, giving a short line of 
supply from that city. In front of Westminster a few miles, 
and running from east to west, will be found Big Pipe Creek, a 
stream which, from its size, would probably be found to furnish a 
good defensive position, its location beingjust what was wanted 
for a line of battle on which Baltimore, and consequently 
Washington, could be most successfully defended. Hence 
Meade threw forward his corps in a north-eastwardly direction 
from Frederick, saying to his chief of cavalry, '' I have no other 
instructions to give you than to keep the front and flanks of 
this army well scouted and protected." The selection of the 
Pipe Creek line, whether intended as one on which to form as 
the army moved forward, or as a position to fall back upon 
after the army had passed beyond, was an admirable one. 
That Meade did not propose to form that line advancing is 
sufficiently shown by the fact that on the ist of July every 
corps of his army, with the exception possibly of the 6th, was 
north of that line, and the line was being examined and located 
by staff officers with a view to occupying it. 

Should Lee, whose positions were still imperfectl)^ known, 



15 

suddenly assume the offensive towards the Army of the Poto- 
mac, Meade was prepared to place his army on the defensive 
in a position he knew all about. But on the ist of July he re- 
ceived the news he was anxiously awaiting; and learned that 
the indefatigable Buford had discovered the enemy, and that 
in hurrying to Buford's assistance the brave, skillful soldier, 
John F. Reynolds, who never failed to obey the soldier's in- 
stinct by marching to the sound of the guns, had fallen. 

I pause a moment to lay a wreath upon the ashes of this 
great soldier and brave, honest, warm-hearted gentleman. I 
was once irritated beyond measure at hearing a prominent 
officer attempt to defend John F. Reynolds from the charge of 
rashness for his action on the ist of July. John F. Reynolds 
needs no defense ! His conduct on that day was pre-emi- 
nently prudent, except in the one particular of personal expo- 
sure ; but personal fearlessness was one of John F. Reynolds' 
characteristics. The stand he made with his troops rendered 
it possible for Meade to gain a victory at Gettysburg. In hot 
haste, Meade at Taneytown dispatched Hancock to replace 
Reynolds. As one of the numerous controversies which have 
arisen since the battle of Gettysburg is in regard to the powers 
bestowed upon General Hancock on that occasion, a smiple 
quotation from Meade's letter of instruction, dated i.io P. M., 
July 1st, ought to be sufficient to settle the question. It says: 
" That you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in 
case of the truth of General Reynolds' death, you assume coin- 
mand of the corps there assembled, viz. : the nth, ist, and 3d, 
at Emmittsburg." Hancock, of course, obeyed his order. 

One other point in this same letter of instruction it is well to 
note as bearing upon the site of the coming battle. " If you 
think (it says) the ground and position there a better one on 
which to fight a battle, wider existing circuinstances, you will so 
advise the General, and lie zvill order all the troops up!' Mark 
the peculiar phraseology, " a better one on which to fight a 
battle." 



i6 

A " better one " than what? Why of course than Big Pipe 
Creek, for the letter adds, " You know the Generals vietvs, and 
General Warren, zvho is fully aware of them, has gone out to 
see General Reynolds." Thus did General Meade commit 
substantially to his chosen Lieutenant the determination of the 
site of the coming battle. Had Reynolds lived the question 
would probably have turned upon the opinion of that distin- 
guished soldier. But Reynolds having fallen, Meade decided 
to replace him by one whom he knew and on whose judgment 
he could rely. 

Hancock's report, after his arrix-al on the ground, scarcely 
met the question submitted in his letter of instruction, but on 
such as it was Meade formed his decision, ordered "all the 
troops up," and by a night ride placed himself on the field of 
battle, shortly after midnight. 

Since that battle almost as many claimants for the merit of 
selecting the field of battle at Gettysburg have sprung up as 
there were cities to claim the birthplace of Homer. As I have 
shown, the action of Reynolds' command rendered the occu- 
pation of that field possible. After the action of the 1st of 
July, a man might as well claim merit for a fluid flowing into 
the mouth of a bottle because he poured it into the funnel, as 
to claim the selection of Cemetery Ridge for the coming bat- 
tle. When our troops were driven from Seminary Ridge, 
Cemetery Ridge was the place and the only place for them to 
rally, and there they were rallied and placed in position by 
Hancock, whose opportune arrival on the field was fully ad- 
mitted at the time in the army. 

That Meade's determination to fight at Gettysburg was fully 
made up, is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that every 
corps of his army was that night directed to that point; the 
5th Corps marching nearly all night and the 6th all night and 
part of the next day to reach it. 

The battle of Gettysburg, a purely defensive one, is remark- 
able, not so much for anything that Meade did or did not do 



17 

there, as it is for the fact that taking command only three days 
before the battle he moved his army forward without a day's 
delay, placed it in position on Cemetery Ridge, repulsed all 
assaults of Lee's army, and compelled it to retreat out of 
Pennsylvania and the abandonment of its offensive campaign. 
His action and the results were hailed with satisfaction by the 
authorities and the loyal people of the country. To compare 
small things with great ones, Meade's task may be aptly lik- 
ened to that imposed upon a man in whose hands the reins of 
a spirited team are placed at a critical moment and on a diffi- 
cult road, and who succeeds in avoiding the ruts, rocks, and 
stumps of an unknown route, and lands his passengers safe 
and sound at the end of their journey. 

His task, and the manner in which he performed it, were 
duly appreciated and highly applauded, when on the 4th of 
July, 1863, the' results of- the battle were flashed over the 
country, and meji, women, and children, who had stood with 
bated breath when the invasion was in progress, now breathed 
once more, and felt that the country was saved. 

I have stated that Meade's principal anxiety, previous to 
the battle, seemed to be lest Lee should succeed in crossing 
the Susquehanna before he could close upon him sufficiently 
to compel him to let go his hold upon that stream. But his 
able opponent was not to be caught in any such trap, and had 
already given orders for the concentration of his army near 
Gettysburg, in his rear, before the conflict of July ist took 
place. 

I do not expect this assemblage to agree with me in what I 
am now going to say, but as a military question I have but little 
doubt that had Meade failed in preventing Lee from crossing 
the Susquehanna it would have been better for us, even had 
this city of Philadelphia reverberated with the sound of hos- 
tile guns ! Had Lee marched on this city with the Army of 
the Potomac behind him, it is a safe prediction that his army, 
as an organization, would never have recrossed the Potomac, 
and probably never the Susquehanna. 



But in making this criticism I am placing myself'in the 
numerous category of those who after the battle have demon- 
strated to their own satisfaction how much better this cam- 
paign viiglit have been conducted than it was. " Heroes" are 
always more numerous after a battle than before one, or whilst 
it is going on, and military problems are always more easily 
solved after all the unknown quantities have become known, 
than they are during the conflict, when most of these quanti- 
ties are still the cloudy x's, y's, and z's of the equation. 

It is worth no man's while to attempt to defend General 
Meade from a charge which came very near being made the 
pretext for depriving him of the command of the arm.y. 
Those who knew the character of the man will not hesitate to 
accept as conclusive his adjuration made before the Commit- 
tee on the conduct of the war, and repeated in. other places 
with the same earnestness. " I deny (he says), under the full 
solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction 
that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be 
known — I utterly deny ever having intended, or thought for 
one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military con- 
tingencies, which the future should develop during the course 
of the day, might render it a matter of necessity that the 
army should be withdrawn." 

But, whilst not deeming it necessary to attempt any defense 
against this charge of an intended retreat, I believe the time 
has now come, and that this is a suitable occasion, to emphat- 
ically declare, no matter what errors or misconceptions may 
have existed in the minds of others, there is not the slightest 
evidence tending to show any intention in the mind of Gen- 
eral Meade to retreat from the field of Gettysburg on the 
morning of the 2d of July, or at an}- other time during the 
continuance of the battle. 

A free country is sometimes a hard master, and where the 
whole nation was wrought up to the intense feeling which ex- 
isted here in 1863, the demands made upon its public servants 



19 

are apt to be exorbitant and occasionally somewhat unreason- 
able. Satisfied, for the moment, with the total repulse of 
Lee's army and the defeat of his invasion, the next demand 
was for the annihilation of his army. But a well-organized, 
well-disciplined, and brave army, even when defeated, is not 
annihilated every day, and the only instances of the capture 
of large armies during our civil war were where they were so 
reduced in numbers or supplies as to render any further re- 
sistance hopeless in a military point of view. 

Meade, conscientious, honest, and faithful, but quick-tem- 
pered, was cut to the quick by Halleck's dispatch con- 
veying to him, in terms which the good President would 
hardly have made use of himself, the " great dissatisfaction in 
the mind of the President" at "the escape of Lee's army 
without another battle," and adding that " it will require an 
active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the im- 
pression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore." 

Fancy such a dispatch sent the commander of a victorious 
army, with whose gallant deeds the whole country with one 
voice was applauding ! Is it any wonder that the quick-tem- 
pered soldier, smarting under the undeserved rebuke, should 
have instantly replied, at 2.30 P. M. the same day : " Having 
performed my duty conscientiously, and to the best of my 
ability, the censure of the President (conveyed in your dis- 
patch of I P. M. this day) is, in my judgment, so undeserved 
that I feel compelled, most respectfully, to ask to be immedi- 
ately relieved from the command of this army." 

But the Government could not afford to comply with his 
request, and with grim humor, in commenting afterwards upon 
Halleck's reply to it, Meade said it was even worse than the 
original dispatch, for, whilst disclaiming any intention to cen- 
sure, added that it was sent simply "as a stimulus to an active 
pursuit ! " 

That great soldier who has been named " The Rock of 
Chickamauga," situated under similar circumstances, but with 



20 

a disposition more even-tempered than Meade's, took time by 
the forelock and humbly telegraphed, "if it be deemed advisa- 
ble to relieve me from the command of this army I will sub- 
mit without a murmur." It was thus that great soldiers treated 
any imputation against their faithful performance of duty or 
their conscientious exercise of their judgment as commanders 
on the spot. 

It is not necessary to follow closely General Meade's oper- 
ations subsequent to the battle of Gettysburg and up to the 
close of the war, for most of the facts have now become 
matters of history. Succeeding to the command of the Army 
of the Potomac in a way utterl)- unexpected to himself, 
his appointment was the result neither of personal solici- 
tations on his own part, nor of the political intrigues which' 
but too frequently governed in such cases. He was placed in 
command unidentified with any of the cliques popularly sup- 
posed to exist in that army, and yet there were not wanting 
those who attributed some of his prominent acts to the influ- 
ence of this, that, or the other party. Cheered by the assurance 
of the Secretary of War that the whole power of the War De- 
partment should be exerted in his support, he selected, as far as 
in his power, and according to his best judgment, those on whom 
he could best rely in the crisis thus suddenly confronting him. 
That he would, in this way, necessarily make some enemies 
he does not for a moment appear to have contemplated, nor, 
if he thought of it at all, does he seem to have cared. With 
well-defined opinions and the courage to carry them out, he 
followed the course, in ever}- case, which in his judgment ap- 
peared to him the best and soundest, disregarding alike hos- 
tile criticism and the carping comments of the public press, 
recognizing the fact that the position he occupied had always 
been open to public criticism, and that a sufficient answer 
in all cases would be the success of his army if directed 
on true military principles. That he was eminently qual- 
ified, by firmness and decision, for the position he occupied 



21 

is sufficiently shown by his not hesitating to fall back in the 
autumn of 1865, when Lee assumed the offensive, and by 
his retreat from Mine Run when it was discovered that an as- 
sault upon Lee's intrenched position was too hazardous to be 
undertaken. His decision in this last case was complicated, 
too, by the fact that it was, 'in a measure, forced upon him by 
one of his subordinates. Under General Warren, one of his 
most trusted corps commanders, was placed a large portion of 
the army to make a flank attack. The hour for the attack 
arrived, and the sound of Warren's guns was anxiously 
awaited. But they were not heard, and at last came the news 
that in Warren's judgment the attack, under the changed cir- 
cumstances of the case, ought not to be made. Meade recog- 
nized too fully the rights and responsibilities resting on the 
shoulders of the commander on the spot to find fault with 
Warren's action, and, though with sore regret, he acquiesced 
in it and withdrew his army without accomplishing the object 
of the expedition. It is believed that General Warren lost 
nothing in the estimation of his commanding general, who 
recognized in its fullest sense the duty incumbent upon a 
commanding officer to protect the rights of his subordinates 
when, with the responsibilities of detached commanders thrown 
upon their shoulders, they continuously exercised their best 
judgment in the execution of their orders. 

And now a time was approaching when General Meade was 
to be subjected to the most trying ordeal of his whole mili- 
tary career. In the spring of the year following the great 
battle of Gettysburg, General Grant, having been invested 
with the command of all the armies of the United States, 
established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. 
None but a military man similarly situated can appreciate to 
its fullest extent the trying position of the commander of a 
great army, just victorious under his command, so placed as 
to have his every order and disposition made directly under 
the eye of a higher officer on the spot, no matter with how 
much consideration and delicacy that officer may act. 



No one can know, and probably no one ev^er will know to 
its fullest extent, the trials and heartburnings incident to the 
memorable campaign of 1864. That campaign did not really 
terminate until Lee's army laid down its arms at Appomattox 
Court House in the following April, and tlicn Meade was still 
commanding the Army of the Potomac. 

The maxim that one poor general is better than two good 
ones in the field will not lose any of its force when the his- 
tory of the campaign of 1864 comes to be written. No man 
can serv^e two masters nor can any army, without the two ex- 
ercising a degree of consideration and forbearance not com- 
patible with ordinary human nature during a state of war. 
Even with the greatest care and every disposition on the part 
of the superior for harmonious action, clashing of orders, with 
the worst results, are sure to occur. That Meade, quick-tem- 
pered and excitable as was his nature, retained the command 
of the army to the end, is as creditable to his patriotism and 
his devotion to the army as were the sound judgment and 
good sense of the commander of all our armies creditable to 
him in retaining him there. 

When General Grant took command, General Meade, with 
the instincts of the true soldier, frankly stated to him that he 
probably would desire to make his own selection for the com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac, and he begged him to 
understand that he would cheerfully yield to his decision, 
whatever it might be. But General Grant made no change, 
and at the termination of hostilities complimented highly 
General Meade for the faithful manner in which he had per- 
formed the duties of his position. 

The long, tedious, trying, and sanguinary campaign of 1864 
followed, terminating with the siege of Peter.sburg, and the 
following spring the brave old Army of the Potomac had the 
satisfaction of seeing its four years' antagonist broiight to bay 
at Appomattox Court House, where its arms were laid down 
forever. 



From the creation of the Army of the Potomac to its dis- 
bandment in 1865 it had five commanders; of these General 
Meade, the last one, commanded it for about one-half of the 
whole period. 

With one exception. General Meade possessed less than any' 
of the commanders that magnetic attraction which does so 
much to bind together the commanding general and the rank 
and file of his army, an attraction which was so marked a 
characteristic in the careers of McClellan and Thomas, Lee 
and Stonewall Jackson, and the absence of which Grant so 
frankly deplores in his own person. But whilst this attrac- 
tion in Meade's case was lacking, there never was a time dur- 
ing his long and eventful career at the head of that army when 
it, as an army, from the highest officer to the lowest private in 
the ranks, with few exceptions, did not bestow upon him its 
fullest confidence, and place the most implicit reliance upon 
his ability to command and his intention to do under all cir- 
cumstances that which was best for their welfare and success 
and for the good of the whold imperiled country. 

We are assembled here to-day, nearly fifteen years after this 
distinguished soldier crossed the Great River, to inaugurate 
in his honor this fitting memorial to his bravery and distin- 
guished services as a soldier, his high-toned honorable charac- 
ter as a man, and his virtues and integrity as a citizen of this 
great Republic, desirous of testifying by our words and actions 
the high esteem in which we hold him, and to hand down to 
the latest generations that in the great fight to maintain this 
free Government, to perpetuate our liberties and our glorious 
example of freedom to the world, of all the heroes who found 
death upon a thousand battle-fields, of all the leaders who 
guided these heroes to final victory, this country produced no 
one more courageous, more conscientious, or more faithful in 
every trust committed to his charge, than 

GEORGE GORDON MEADE. 



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